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Abstract
We compare the empirical performance of unitary and collective labor
supply models, using representative data from the Dutch DNB House-
hold Survey. We conduct a nonparametric analysis that avoids the dis-
tortive impact of an erroneously speci￿ed functional form for the prefer-
ences and/or the intrahousehold bargaining process. Our analysis focuses
on the goodness-of-￿t of the two behavioral models. To guarantee a fair
comparison, we complement this goodness-of-￿t analysis with a power
analysis. Our results strongly favor the collective approach to modeling
the behavior of multi-person households.
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11 Introduction
Standard microeconomic theory assumes that a household acts as if it were a
single decision maker. Within this tradition, household demand is assumed to
result from maximizing a unique utility function subject to a household bud-
get constraint. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that this unitary
model is at odds with observed household behavior; the associated restrictions
of homogeneity, symmetry and negativity have been rejected at numerous oc-
casions (e.g., Fortin and Lacroix, 1997, and Browning and Chiappori, 1998).
A more recent alternative, the so-called collective approach to household be-
havior (Chiappori, 1988, 1992), explicitly takes account of the fact that multi-
person households consist of several individuals with their own rational prefer-
ences; household decisions are then the Pareto e¢ cient outcomes of a bargaining
process. This collective approach entails other behavioral restrictions than the
unitary model. Interestingly enough, these restrictions seem to better ￿t the
data than the unitary restrictions; e.g., Browning et al. (1994), Fortin and
Lacroix (1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori et al. (2002) and
Vermeulen (2005).
Still, the hitherto employed tests of the unitary and collective models are
parametric in nature. Hence, they crucially depend on the functional form that
is used for representing the preferences and/or the intrahousehold bargaining
process. They do not only test the unitary or collective approach as such, but
also an ad hoc functional speci￿cation; a rejection of the unitary model may
well be due to ill-speci￿cation.
Nonparametric tests for consistency of observed behavior with utility max-
imization or Pareto e¢ ciency do not require any assumptions regarding the
parametric form of utility functions or the intrahousehold bargaining process;
see, e.g., Afriat (1967), Varian (1982), Chiappori (1988) and Snyder (2000).
These tests are solely based on revealed preference theory, which makes them
particularly attractive for testing consistency of the data with theoretical be-
havioral models.
This directly suggests using nonparametric testing tools for comparing the
empirical performance of the unitary and collective models. However, to the
best of our knowledge, an in-depth nonparametric comparison has not yet been
carried out. This paper wants to ￿ll that gap, by studying the speci￿c case of
household labor supply. Conveniently, our focus on labor supply also guarantees
substantial price/wage variation across individuals, which can only bene￿t the
empirical comparison.
Our following assessment speci￿cally concentrates on two types of (nonpara-
metric) empirical performance measures: goodness-of-￿t measures and power
measures. We indeed believe that a fair comparison of the two behavioral models
under study should complement a goodness-of-￿t analysis with a power analy-
sis: favorable goodness-of-￿t results, indicating few violations of the behavioral
restrictions, have little meaning if the behavioral implications have low power,
i.e., optimizing behavior can hardly be rejected.
Our empirical evaluation uses representative Dutch data taken from the DNB
2Household Survey. The data set that we focus on is divided in three subsamples:
working female singles, working male singles and couples where both spouses
are working. We essentially discuss two types of comparisons:
- First, we compare the empirical performance of the unitary model for singles
with that for couples. The rationale of this comparison is that the standard
unitary approach should always be fully applicable to singles, even if it does
not well ￿t the observed behavior of couples. This ￿rst comparison should give
us a deeper understanding of the harmless/harmful nature of the aggregation
assumptions that underlie the unitary modeling of couples￿behavior.
- Second, we compare the empirical results of the collective model with those of
the unitary model, both applied to the data of couples. Because the collective
and unitary models evidently have di⁄erent implications for couples￿behavior,
these results should give us a better insight into which of the models does the
better job in describing multi-person household consumption behavior.
Section 2 brie￿ y reviews the nonparametric methodology for testing the uni-
tary and the collective labor supply models. In addition, we introduce the non-
parametric goodness-of-￿t and power measures. Section 3 presents the results
of our application to Dutch household data. Section 4 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Testing the unitary model
For the sake of compactness, we only discuss unitary consistency tests for couples
with two working individuals (M and F). Our discussion is directly translated
to the singles￿case.
The nonparametric approach starts from n observations for household con-
sumption and the household members￿ labor supply. For each household i
(i = 1;:::;n) we denote the net wage rate and leisure amount of individual I
(I = M;F) by wI
i and lI
i, respectively. (The leisure amount is computed from
observed labor supply ‘I
i = T ￿ lI
i, with T the individuals￿time endowment.)
Next, we use yi and ci to respectively denote household i￿ s nonlabor income
and consumption. The household￿ s nonlabor income aggregates the spouses￿
assignable unearned incomes and, possibly, unearned income that cannot be as-
signed to one of the spouses. It should be stressed that we focus on a standard
static labor supply model; i.e., households are assumed not to save nor to draw
down their assets (see, e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Finally, we represent











Within the unitary model, the decision problem of each household i boils











i ￿ yi + wM
i T + wF
i T; without losing
generality, we set the price of consumption to 1. A necessary and su¢ cient
condition for the data to be consistent with this utility maximization problem
is that there exists a function v that rationalizes the household data, i.e., for all



















j ￿ yi + wM
i T + wF
i T: (1)
Varian (1982) has demonstrated that such a data rationalizing utility func-
tion exists if and only if the observed set S is consistent with the General-
ized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). To formally state this last consis-













ml for some sequence of bundles
(li;lj;:::;lm).
We can now de￿ne GARP as:





jl for RPj = fli : liRlj;i 2 f1;:::;ngg:
This de￿nition expresses the idea that observation j is utility maximizing
subject to its budget constraint if and only if it is expenditure minimizing over
its ￿ better than￿set; in the (empirical) GARP this last set is approximated by
the ￿ revealed preferred￿set RPj:
Consistency of S with GARP is easily tested: we ￿rst identify the sets
RPj and subsequently check the expenditure minimization condition for each
observation. See Varian (1982; p. 949) for an e¢ cient algorithm.
2.2 Testing the collective model
We focus on a collective model with egoistic preferences; preferences only depend
on own consumption and leisure (Chiappori, 1988). Moreover, we assume that
there is no public consumption in the household.1 Empirically, the modeling of
this collective approach is somewhat more involved as the private consumption
of each household member is usually not observed; labor supply data sets only
reveal information on total household consumption (as the sum of earned and
unearned incomes).















i (I = M;F). Using
this, we consider the case where each couple i is characterized by a pair of
1The analysis is in fact also applicable to individual caring preferences, which can be





(I = M;F); see
Chiappori (1992) for a detailed discussion. Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2004) provide
a nonparametric characterization of a general collective model with public goods and exter-
nalities. Given the current paper￿ s objective, we focus on a rather simple collective model,
which can be considered as a direct generalization of the unitary model. Of course, if this
rudimentary collective model outperforms the unitary model for describing couples￿behavior,
then this will certainly be the case for any more re￿ned collective model.

















that determines the distribution of the household￿ s nonlabor
income yi over the household members (see Chiappori, 1988):





















The sharing rule concept allows us to model household behavior as a two-
stage budgeting process. After dividing total nonlabor income in the ￿rst stage,
















which is formally similar to the unitary household decision problem; see (1).
Chiappori (1992) demonstrated that the resulting household allocation is always
Pareto e¢ cient.
This alternative interpretation of Pareto e¢ cient household behavior is par-
ticularly convenient within the nonparametric context, as it entails the same
kind of GARP tests as for the unitary model: if we knew private consumption
for each observation (cM
i and cF
i ), then we could immediately check consistency
of the observed set S by using the standard GARP tests at the level of the
household members. In practice, however, we do not observe the intrahousehold
allocation of total consumption. This entails the following empirical condition
for the collective model (see also Chiappori, 1988):
De￿nition 4 The observed set S is consistent with a collective rationalization




















i ￿ yi + wM
i T + wF
i T
and
GARP is satis￿ed at the individual level (I = M;F):







Thus, given that the intrahousehold consumption allocation is not observed,








i); i = 1;:::;n; I = M; Fg that are consistent
with GARP for both individuals.
Snyder (2000) introduced an ￿ all-or-nothing￿nonparametric test for the col-
lective model.2 In that test, either data satisfy collective rationality or they
do not. We follow a di⁄erent approach, induced by our speci￿c focus on the
goodness-of-￿t of the alternative behavioral models. Our starting point is that
the collective rationalization test boils down to standard GARP tests conditional
2In her analysis, Snyder restricts attention to the case n=2, while we consider the more
general case; e.g., in our application n=586 (see Section 3.1).
5upon an intrahousehold consumption allocation (cM
i and cF
i ). Speci￿cally, we
impute (unobserved) member-speci￿c private consumption amounts by exploit-
ing a systematic ￿nding in parametric studies of collective labor supply, namely
the positive correlation between the male/female member￿ s share of total nonla-
bor income and the corresponding individual wage (e.g., Chiappori et al., 2002,
and Vermeulen, 2005).
Using this, our nonparametric testing exercise considers the following pair of
distributions for the female consumption share sF
i (= cF
i =ci; the corresponding
male share equals 1￿sF
i ): the ￿rst distribution has mean 0.40 and a cumulative
probability of 95% for the values between 0.35 and 0.45; the second distribution
has mean 0.60 and a cumulative probability of 95% for the values between 0.55
and 0.65. From these distributions, we draw 1000 combinations of sF
i values




i ) then sF
i is drawn from the ￿rst (second)
distribution. We subsequently select the combination of shares with the highest
number of individual (male and female) household members passing GARP. This
combination is used for comparing the empirical performance of the collective
model with that of the unitary model.3
As a ￿nal note, we must emphasize that this approach does not guarantee
the most favorable treatment of the collective model: to ensure computational
tractability, our procedure restricts attention to a limited number of possible
combinations of intrahousehold allocations; there may well exist other, non-
investigated, combinations that are associated with an even higher number of
individuals consistent with GARP. We can therefore state that our empirical
analysis implicitly gives the ￿ bene￿t of the doubt￿to the unitary model.
2.3 Empirical performance: goodness-of-￿t
The consistency tests reviewed above are ￿ sharp￿tests; they only tell us whether
observations are exactly optimizing in terms of the behavioral model that is
under evaluation. However, as argued by Varian (1990), exact optimization
is not a very interesting hypothesis. Rather, we want to know whether the
behavioral model under study provides a reasonable way to describe observed
behavior; for most purposes, ￿ nearly optimizing behavior￿is just as good as
￿ optimizing￿behavior. Varian￿ s argument is all the more valid in the context
of comparing theoretical behavioral models: we are primarily interested in the
extent to which one model ￿ ￿ts￿the observed data better than the other model.
Therefore, our following assessment will be based on measures of goodness-of-￿t.
Our goodness-of-￿t measure is the ￿ improved violation index￿(or ￿ e¢ ciency
index￿ ) proposed by Varian (1993; based on Afriat, 1973; see also Cox, 1997),
which indicates the degree to which the data are ￿ optimizing￿(or ￿ e¢ cient￿ ) in
the sense of the evaluated behavioral model. More speci￿cally, this index gives
for each observation the minimal perturbation of the expenditure level that
3We also experimented with alternative means for the above normal distributions (including
a rule where both distributions have mean 0.50). But this did not yield a higher number of
(male and female) household members passing GARP.
6guarantees consistency of the observed set S with GARP. See Varian (1993)
and Cox (1997) for in-depth formal discussions of this goodness-of-￿t measure.
2.4 Empirical performance: power
We compute six di⁄erent power measures. A ￿rst distinction relates to the con-
sumption data that is used. The ￿rst data set (used for the measures Power1a,
Power1b and Power1c that will be introduced below) consists of the original
consumption and leisure data for the unitary model and the combination of
observed and partly imputed data for the collective model. The second data set
(used for the measures Power2a, Power2b and Power2c) multiplies the original
expenditure level for each observation with the corresponding improved violation
index value (at the household level for the unitary model and at the individual
level for the collective model); this anticipates the question to what extent the
necessary data perturbation for obtaining GARP consistency (captured by the
improved violation index) would e⁄ectively impact on the power estimates.
For each data set we compute two types of power measures proposed by
Bronars (1987) and one additional measure. Bronars￿two measures essentially
pertain to the ￿ mimicking￿of irrational behavior ￿ la Becker (1962), by means
of a speci￿c randomization procedure for constructing irrational consumption
bundles. Each power measure then captures the probability of detecting that ir-
rational behavior, which acts as the alternative hypothesis to the null hypothesis
that is tested. Bronars￿￿rst measure, labeled Power1a (Power2a) for the ￿rst
(second) data set, is based on the alternative hypothesis that consumers choose
bundles randomly from a uniform distribution across all bundles in their budget
hyperplanes. Since this ￿rst power measure may entail quite extreme behavior
(e.g., consumers jumping from one ￿ corner￿of the budget line to another ￿ cor-
ner￿ ), we also applied Bronars￿second measure, labeled Power1b (Power2b) for
the ￿rst (second) data set.This alternative measure makes extreme (irrational)
behavior less likely than the ￿rst one. (See Bronars, 1987, for formal de￿nitions
of both measures).
Our additional third power measure (labeled Power1c and Power2c when
applied to the ￿rst and second data set respectively) assumes that consumers
randomly draw consumption and leisure bundles from the empirical distribution
as observed in the data. The rationale for this additional measure pertains to
the observation that, e.g., singles who work the same number of hours can never
be involved in a GARP violation vis-￿-vis each other. Since observed working
hours are discretely distributed with an important mass point at a weekly labor
supply of 40 hours for males, and with mass points at 40 and 32 hours for females,
such a situation may apply to a nonnegligible number of observations. Our
third power measure accounts for this potential problem and provides a measure
for its importance. The measure basically implies that we remain ignorant
about the alternative hypothesis to the model under study. Still, we recognize
that this power measure may be subject to some criticism. Most importantly,
and contrary to Beckerian irrational behavior, random behavior based on the
empirical distribution may seem logically inconsistent since it potentially mixes
7both rational and irrational behavioral aspects. One should take into account
that both the null hypothesis (the model under study) and the (unspeci￿ed)
alternative hypothesis give rise to exactly the same distributions.
For a given data set and randomization procedure, the speci￿c construc-
tion of the power measures ￿rst simulates irrational/random behavior for each
observation, and subsequently checks consistency with GARP for each obser-
vation. In our empirical application, we repeat this procedure 200 times. The
proportion of rejections of GARP (over these 200 replications) then gives the
probability of detecting irrational/random behavior of each observation, given
random behavior of the other observations.
Hence, for each behavioral model that we evaluate we measure power in each
element of the observed set S. This practice contrasts with e.g. Bronars (1987)
and Cox (1997), who provide overall power measures that are based on the entire
sample. Their measures reveal the probability that random behavior of at least
one observation in the sample is detected. In our opinion, evaluating power at
the level of individual observations is more informative. For example, it provides
a more detailed insight into the extent to which the di⁄erent observations can
cause rejection of the model under study; we believe that there is a stronger
case for a model that has high power in many observations than for a model
with high power in only a few observations. Also, an observation-speci￿c power
measure naturally links up with our observation-speci￿c goodness-of-￿t measure;
persistently high goodness-of-￿t values for a given sample of observations are all
the more convincing evidence in favor of a particular behavioral model if they
are complemented with high power values for the same sample.
3 Application
3.1 Data and methodological issues
We use 11 waves of the DNB Household Survey (formerly known as the CentER
Savings Survey), drawn from 1995 until 2005. The data are representative for
the Dutch population and are collected every year for a panel of more than 2000
households. The survey contains a rich amount of economic, socio-demographic
and psychological variables. We focus on three subsamples: female singles,
male singles and couples. The ￿rst two subsamples consist of female and male
singles that meet the following criteria: no children, aged between 25 and 55
and employed. The third subsample consists of (de-facto) couples, where the
household members meet the same criteria as the selected singles. To minimize
the impact of measurement error, we trimmed out from each subsample those
households that include a (female/male) member with a wage that lies above
the 97.5 percentile or below the 2.5 percentile of the empirical (female/male)
wage distribution. This yields samples of 522 single females, 888 single males
and 586 couples. Table 3 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics for each
subsample.
Cox (1997) and Snyder (2000) conduct nonparametric tests of labor sup-
8ply behavior on time-series micro-data and, hence, exclude preference variation
over time. Our analysis deviates in that we assume constant preferences in each
subsample (female singles, male singles and couples); in each subsample, all
observations correspond to the same preferences but to di⁄erent price regimes.
Our motivation for this particular preference homogeneity assumption is three-
fold. Firstly, the DNB Household Survey was subject to substantial attrition
between 1995 and 2005. Only a relatively small number of households were
observed in all the waves, which implies too few households with 11 consecutive
observations for robust nonparametric testing based on time-series data. Sec-
ondly, our selection criteria ensure relatively homogeneous subsamples, which
makes that our equal preference assumption does not seem overly strong.4 Fi-
nally, and importantly, recall that we focus on goodness-of-￿t measures in our
following analysis. Obviously, this practice anticipates some preference variation
over households.
3.2 Singles versus couples
Figure 1 presents the cumulative distribution functions (c.d.f.￿ s) of the goodness-
of-￿t measures (i.e., the improved violation indexes, in ascending order) asso-
ciated with the unitary model for female singles, male singles and couples.5
When restricting to the ￿ sharp￿GARP test, we would conclude rejection for
all three subsamples; most observations have an index value that is less than
100%. We note that this result should not be very surprising in view of our
preference homogeneity assumption. It seems more meaningful to look at the
entire distribution of the goodness-of-￿t measure.
[Figure 1 about here]
When considering the c.d.f.￿ s more closely, we observe important di⁄erences
between couples and singles. Firstly, we ￿nd that 39% of the female singles and
28% of the male singles are fully e¢ cient, as opposed to only 12% of the couples.
Secondly, and more importantly, the index values of couples are generally below
those of singles; the couples￿distribution is stochastically dominated by the two
singles￿distributions. One-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests con￿rm this overall
picture: the null hypothesis of equal distributions of couples on the one hand
and male and female singles on the other hand is strongly rejected in favor of
the alternative hypothesis that the couples￿index systematically lies below the
respective singles￿indexes; see Table 1.
As discussed above, it is recommendable to complement this goodness-of-￿t
analysis with a power analysis. Figure 2 presents the c.d.f.￿ s of the individually
4Compare, e.g., with Famulari (1995) who analyzes consistency of observed behaviour
with GARP (in the unitary framework) for homogeneous subgroups of households that are
identi￿ed on the basis of similar selection criteria.
5For expositional convenience, the c.d.f.￿ s have been cut o⁄ at the 91% e¢ ciency level since
no observation has a violation index below that ￿gure. We also explicitly distinguish between
indexes that are equal to 1 and those that are less than 1.
9calculated Power1a indexes for single females, single males and couples.6 This
￿gure reveals high power for most observations: 98% of the couples, 96% of
the male singles and 95% of the female singles have a power index value that
exceeds 95%; for these observations, irrational random behavior will be detected
with a probability of at least 95%. More generally, while the overall power for
couples appears to be slightly higher than for female and male singles, Figure
2 suggests that the di⁄erences remain marginal. This impression is con￿rmed
by one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests: we cannot reject (at any reasonable
signi￿cance level) equality of the c.d.f.￿ s in favor of the alternative hypothesis
that the power index values for female and male singles are lower than those for
couples; see Table 1.
We obtain exactly the same qualitative conclusions for the power measures
Power2a, Power1b and Power2b (see also Table 1): power index values are
generally very high, while equality of the c.d.f.￿ s for the three subsamples cannot
be rejected. Although power index values are also relatively high for the power
measures Power1c and Power2c, equality of the c.d.f.￿ s for the three subsamples
is rejected. At this point, it is worth recalling the potential criticism on the latter
power measures in Section 2.4. From that perspective, these power measures
(especially for singles) only give some indication about the importance of the
mass points in the empirical distribution (at 40 hours for example) and the
consequent failure to come to a GARP rejection for observations at these mass
points.7
We conclude that the relatively poor performance of the unitary model for
describing observed couples￿behavior (when compared to singles￿behavior) can
hardly be attributed solely to higher power of the model for the associated
couples￿consistency tests. In our opinion, these ￿ndings strongly question the
harmless nature of the aggregation assumptions in the unitary approach to
modeling couples￿behavior.
[Figure 2 about here]
[Table 1 about here]
3.3 Unitary versus collective model
Our previous ￿ndings cast doubts on the usefulness of the unitary model for
analyzing couples￿behavior. As a natural next step, we investigate whether the
collective approach provides a better alternative for modeling couples￿behavior,
by comparing its empirical performance with that of the unitary model. Like
before, our unitary results refer to GARP tests at the aggregate household level.
By contrast, our collective results are obtained from applying GARP tests to the
individual members of each couple, hereby using the intrahousehold allocations
obtained by the procedure described in Section 2.2.
6In contrast to Figure 1, Figure 2 presents the whole c.d.f. The reason is that a few
observations have low power indexes.
7Table 4 in the Appendix contains other descriptive statistics on the di⁄erent power dis-
tributions. For the sake of brevity, these statistics are not further discussed here.
10Figure 3 presents the c.d.f.￿ s of the goodness-of-￿t measure for couples (in
the unitary model) and female and male household members (in the collective
model). In line with our earlier results, more individuals than aggregate house-
holds behave consistently with the utility maximization hypothesis: 26% of the
men and 14% of the women are 100% e¢ cient, while only 12% of the couples
attain an improved violation index value of 100%. In fact, Figure 3 reveals a
picture that is roughly similar to that in Figure 1: the (unitary) couples￿distri-
bution is stochastically dominated by the (collective) distributions of the male
and female household members. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results in Table
2 provide further evidence in support of the collective model: the null hypothe-
sis of equal c.d.f.￿ s is strongly rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that
the couples￿improved violation index systematically lies below that for women
and men in the collective model.
[Figure 3 about here]
Again, we complement this goodness-of-￿t analysis with a power analysis.
Our power results persistently indicate that the better ￿t of the collective model
is not due to lower power. For example, Figure 4 clearly shows that the distri-
bution of the Power1a values is practically the same for couples (in the unitary
model) and individuals (in the collective model). This observation is formalized
in Table 2: one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reveal that equality of the
c.d.f.￿ s of the power indexes cannot be rejected at any reasonable signi￿cance
level. Moreover, the power indexes are generally high: 98% of the couples (in
the unitary model), 98% of the females and 98% of the males (in the collective
model) have a power index that amounts to at least 95%. Just like in Section
3.2, we checked the sensitivity of these power results. Interestingly, the power
measures Power2a, Power1b and Power2b entail the same qualitative conclu-
sions as Power1a (see also Table 2). As for the measures Power1c and Power2c,
we only reject equality of the c.d.f.￿ s when comparing male individuals (in the
collective model) with couples (in the unitary model); equality of the c.d.f.￿ s
cannot be rejected when comparing female individuals with couples. Moreover,
also these measures imply relatively high power indexes.
In our opinion, these results provide strong enough evidence to argue that
the collective approach performs signi￿cantly better than the unitary approach
for modeling couples￿labor supply behavior. In fact, this argument becomes all
the more convincing when taking into account our rather rudimentary procedure
to model the distribution of household consumption over the di⁄erent household
members; more re￿ned allocation rules can only bene￿t the relative performance
of the collective model.8
8This conclusion is in line with that obtained by Snyder (2000), who tested unitary and
collective labor supply models on couples drawn from the 1969 and 1971 National Longitudinal
Survey of Men. More speci￿cally, she focused attention on a sample of 243 couples (with a
similar sample selection as ours), where each household is only two times observed (thus
assuming preference homogeneity over time, but not at the cross-sectional level as we do). It
turns out that collective rationality is not rejected for any couple in her sample, while the
unitary model is rejected for 6 couples. Snyder (2000) did not test the unitary model on
singles, nor did she conduct a power analysis.
11[Figure 4 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
4 Conclusion
We compared the empirical performance of the unitary model to describe house-
hold labor supply behavior with that of the more recently developed collective
model. Our ￿ndings strongly suggest using the collective model for analyzing
the behavior of households consisting of multiple individuals:
- First, we found that the unitary model performs signi￿cantly worse when
applied to couples than when applied to singles. As these results cannot be
attributed to power di⁄erences, we conclude that they signal violations of the
preference aggregation assumptions that underlie the unitary approach, i.e., that
multi-person households behave as single decision makers.
- Second, and probably more importantly, a direct comparison of the collective
model with the unitary model provided additional evidence to support the use
of the collective model: it ￿ts observed couples￿behavior much better than the
unitary model. Again, this signi￿cant di⁄erence cannot be explained by power
di⁄erences. Hence, our ￿ndings do not only indicate that the unitary approach
is too restrictive for modeling the behavior of multi-person households, but also
that the collective model constitutes a more promising alternative.
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Figure 1: Unitary model singles and couples: cumulative distribution function















































































































































Figure 3: Unitary versus collective model couples: cumulative distribution func-

































































































Figure 4: Unitary versus collective model couples: cumulative distribution func-
tion of power
Table 1: Nonparametric test results: Singles versus couples
Single males versus couples Single females versus couples







Power1a (Power2a) is Bronars￿(1987) ￿rst power measure applied to observed
(e¢ ciency corrected) data; Power1b (Power2b) is Bronars￿ (1987) second
power measure applied to observed (e¢ ciency corrected) data; while Power1c
(Power2c) is based on random drawings from the empirical hours distribution
and applied to observed (e¢ ciency corrected) data. Entries show the prob-
ability that the null hypothesis of an equal distribution is not rejected, as
computed on the basis of a one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; we compare
the distributions of the improved violation index and the power indexes for
couples with the respective distributions for single women and single men.
16Table 2: Nonparametric test results: Individuals in couples versus couples
Men in couples versus couples Women in couples versus couples







Power1a (Power2a) is Bronars￿(1987) ￿rst power measure applied to observed
(e¢ ciency corrected) data; Power1b (Power2b) is Bronars￿ (1987) second
power measure applied to observed (e¢ ciency corrected) data; while Power1c
(Power2c) is based on random drawings from the empirical hours distribution
and applied to observed (e¢ ciency corrected) data. Entries show the probabil-
ity that the null hypothesis of an equal distribution is not rejected, as computed
on the basis of a one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; we compare the distri-
butions of the improved violation index and the power index for couples in
the unitary model with the respective distributions for women and men in the
collective model.
Table 3: Sample descriptive statistics
Couples Single males Single females
Variable Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Weekly working hours male 37.80 3.99 37.29 4.15
Weekly working hours female 31.55 7.90 35.27 5.14
Net hourly wage rate male 12.07 4.09 12.18 4.24
Net hourly wage rate female 9.96 3.36 11.08 3.59
Age male 40.77 9.23 40.11 7.52
Age female 38.52 9.10 38.88 8.55
Dummy primary education male 0.13 0.09
Dummy secondary education male 0.35 0.36
Dummy non-academic higher education male 0.33 0.36
Dummy academic higher education male 0.19 0.19
Dummy primary education female 0.11 0.07
Dummy secondary education female 0.41 0.27
Dummy non-academic higher education female 0.35 0.47
Dummy academic higher education female 0.13 0.19
Weekly nonlabor income 17.49 42.53 13.39 32.13 9.81 28.88
Weekly consumption 782.46 223.17 464.35 163.74 399.38 140.28
Source: DNB Household Survey 1995-2005. Weekly consumption equals the
sum of earned income and nonlabor income. Monetary variables are in 2005
euro.
17Table 4: Descriptive statistics power indexes
Variable Single males Single females Couples Men in couples Women in couples
Power1a
Mean 98.24 97.43 99.63 98.88 99.41
Standard dev. 0.32 0.59 0.13 0.34 0.19
Median 100 100 100 100 100
Power1b
Mean 98.62 97.17 99.39 98.67 99.20
Standard dev. 0.28 0.61 0.19 0.38 0.24
Median 100 100 100 100 100
Power1c
Mean 85.47 78.58 97.48 93.98 98.26
Standard dev. 0.88 1.52 0.54 0.70 0.44
Median 99.00 98.50 100 100 100
Power2a
Mean 99.61 98.94 99.58 98.87 99.41
Standard dev. 0.14 0.28 0.14 0.34 0.20
Median 100 100 100 100 100
Power2b
Mean 99.22 97.93 99.42 98.75 99.19
Standard dev. 0.17 0.42 0.19 0.37 0.25
Median 100 100 100 100 100
Power2c
Mean 87.90 81.16 97.80 94.74 98.12
Standard dev. 0.85 1.39 0.48 0.67 0.45
Median 100 99.5 100 100 100
Power1a (Power2a) is Bronars￿(1987) ￿rst power measure applied to observed
(e¢ ciency corrected) data; Power1b (Power2b) is Bronars￿ (1987) second
power measure applied to observed (e¢ ciency corrected) data; while Power1c
(Power2c) is based on random drawings from the empirical hours distribution
and applied to observed (e¢ ciency corrected) data. Entries are in percent.
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